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Abstract. We study the geometrical properties of the utility space (the
space of expected utilities over a finite set of options), which is commonly
used to model the preferences of an agent in a situation of uncertainty.
We focus on the case where the model is neutral with respect to the
available options, i.e. treats them, a priori, as being symmetrical from
one another. Specifically, we prove that the only Riemannian metric that
respects the geometrical properties and the natural symmetries of the
utility space is the round metric. This canonical metric allows to define
a uniform probability over the utility space and to naturally generalize
the Impartial Culture to a model with expected utilities.
Keywords: Utility theory, Geometry, Impartial culture, Voting
1 Introduction
Motivation. In the traditional literature of Arrovian social choice [2], especially
voting theory, the preferences of an agent are often represented by ordinal in-
formation only4: a strict total order over the available options, or sometimes a
binary relation of preference that may not be a strict total order (for example
if indifference is allowed). However, it can be interesting for voting systems to
consider cardinal preferences, for at least two reasons.
Firstly, some voting systems are not based on ordinal information only, like
Approval voting or Range voting.
Secondly, voters can be in a situation of uncertainty, either because the rule
of the voting system involves a part of randomness, or because each voter has
incomplete information about other voters’ preferences and the ballots they will
choose. To express preferences in a situation of uncertainty, a classical and el-
egant model is the one of expected utilities [17,5,10,12]. The utility vector −→u
representing the preferences of an agent is an element of Rm, where m is the
number of available options or candidates; the utility of a lottery over the options
is computed as an expected value.
4 This is not always the case: for example, Gibbard [7] considers voters with expected
utilities over the candidates.
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For a broad set of applications in economics, the options under consideration
are financial rewards or quantities of one or several economic goods, which leads
to an important consequence: there is a natural structure over the space of
options. For example, if options are financial rewards, there is a natural order
over the possible amounts and it is defined prior to the agents’ preferences.
We consider here the opposite scenario where options are symmetrical a
priori. This symmetry condition is especially relevant in voting theory, by a
normative principle of neutrality, but it can apply to other contexts of choice
under uncertainty when there is no natural preexistent structure on the space
of available options.
The motivation for this paper came from the possible generalizations of the
Impartial Culture to agents with expected utilities. The Impartial Culture is a
classical probabilistic model in voting theory where each agent draws indepen-
dently her strict total order of preference with a uniform probability over the set
of possible orders.
The difficulty is not to define a probability law over utilities such that its
projection on ordinal information is the Impartial Culture. Indeed, it is sufficient
to define a distribution where voters are independent and all candidates are
treated symmetrically. The issue is to choose one in particular: an infinity of
distributions meet these conditions and we can wonder whether one of these
generalizations has canonical reasons to be chosen rather than the others.
To answer this question, we need to address an important technical point. As
we will see, an agent’s utility vector is defined up to two constants, and choosing
a specific normalization is arbitrary. As a consequence, the utility space is a
quotient space of Rm, and a priori, there is no canonical way to push a metric
from Rm to this quotient space. Hence, at first sight, it seems that there is no
natural definition of a uniform distribution of probability over that space.
More generally, searching a natural generalization of the Impartial Culture to
the utility space naturally leads to investigate different topics about the geometry
of this quotient space and to get a better understanding of its properties related
to algebra, topology and measure theory.
We emphasize that our goal is not to propose a measure that represents real-
life preferences. Such approach would follow from observation and experimental
studies rather than theoretical work. Instead, we aim at identifying a measure
that can play the role of a neutral, reference, measure. This will give a model for
uniformness to which real distributions of utilities can be compared. For example,
if an observed distribution has higher density than the reference measure in
certain regions of the utility space, this could be interpreted as a non-uniform
culture for the population under study and give an indication of an overall trend
for these regions. With this aim in mind, we will assume a symmetry hypothesis
over the different candidates.
Contributions and plan. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we quickly present Von Neumann–Morgenstern framework and define
the utility space. In Section 3, we show that the utility space may be seen as
a quotient of the dual of the space of pairs of lotteries over the candidates.
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In Section 4, we naturally define an inversion operation, that corresponds to
reversing preferences while keeping their intensities, and a summation operation,
that is characterized by the fact that it preserves unanimous preferences.
Since the utility space is a manifold, it is a natural wish to endow it with a
Riemannian metric. In Section 5, we prove that the only Riemannian representa-
tion that preserves the natural projective properties and the a priori symmetry
between the candidates is the round metric. Finally, in Section 6, we use this
result to give a canonical generalization of the Impartial culture and to suggest
the use of Von Mises–Fisher model to represent polarized cultures.
2 Von Neumann–Morgenstern Model
In this section, we define some notations and we quickly recall Von Neumann–
Morgenstern framework in order to define the utility space.
Let m ∈ N \ {0}. We will consider m mutually exclusive options called can-
didates, each one represented by an index in {1, . . . ,m}. A lottery over the
candidates is an m-tuple (L1, . . . , Lm) ∈ (R+)m such that (s.t.)
∑m
j=1 Lj = 1.
The set of lotteries is denoted Lm.
The preferences of an agent over lotteries are represented by a binary relation
≤ over Lm.
Von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem states that, provided that relation ≤
meets quite natural assumptions5, it can be represented by a utility vector −→u =
(u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm, in the sense that following the relation ≤ is equivalent to
maximizing the expected utility. Formally, for any two lotteries L and M :
L ≤M ⇔
m∑
j=1
Ljuj ≤
m∑
j=1
Mjuj .
Mathematical definitions, assumptions and proof of this theorem can be
found in [16,12,10], and discussions about the experimental validity of the as-
sumptions are available in [6,12].
For the purposes of this paper, a crucial point is that −→u is defined up to an
additive constant and a positive multiplicative constant. Formally, for any two
vectors −→u and −→v , let us note −→u ∼ −→v iff ∃a ∈ (0,+∞),∃b ∈ R s.t. −→v = a−→u +b−→1 ,
where
−→
1 denotes the vector whose m coordinates are equal to 1. With this
notation, if −→u ∈ Rm is a utility vector representing ≤, then a vector −→v ∈ Rm is
also a utility vector representing ≤ iff −→u ∼ −→v .
In order to define the utility space, all vectors representing the same prefer-
ences must be identified as only one point. The utility space over m candidates,
denoted Um, is defined as the quotient space Rm/ ∼. We call canonical projection
from Rm to Um the function:
∼
pi :
Rm → Um−→u → ∼u = {−→v ∈ Rm s.t. −→v ∼ −→u }.
For any −→u ∈ Rm, we denote without ambiguity ≤∼u the binary relation over Lm
represented by −→u .
5 The necessary and sufficient condition is that relation ≤ is complete, transitive,
archimedean and independent of irrelevant alternatives.
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−→
1 −→u (2)
−→u (3)
−→u (1)
−→u (4)
−→e1 −→e2
−→e3
∼
u
Fig. 1. Space R3 of utility vectors for 3 candidates (without quotient).
Figure 1 represents the space R3 of utility vectors for 3 candidates, without
projecting to the quotient space. The canonical base of R3 is denoted (−→e1 ,−→e2 ,−→e3).
Utility vectors −→u (1) to −→u (4) represent the same preferences as any other vector
of the half-plane
∼
u, represented in gray. More generally, each non-trivial point
∼
u in the quotient utility space corresponds to a half-plane in Rm, delimited by
the line vect(
−→
1 ), the linear span of
−→
1 . The only exception is the point of total
indifference
∼
0. In Rm, it does not correspond to a plane but to the line vect(−→1 )
itself.
−→
1
−→e2
−→e3
−→e1
(a) Edges of the unit cube in R3.
−→e1 −→e2
−→e3
−→
1
(b) Circle in R3.
Fig. 2. Two representations of U3.
To deal with utilities, conceptually and practically, it would be convenient to
have a canonical representative −→u for each equivalence class ∼u. In Figure 2(a), for
each non-indifferent
∼
u, we choose its representative satisfying min(ui) = −1 and
max(ui) = 1. The utility space U3 (except the indifference point) is represented
in R3 by six edges of the unit cube. In Figure 2(b), we choose the representative
satisfying
∑
ui = 0 and
∑
u2i = 1. In that case, U3 \ {
∼
0} is represented in R3 by
the unit circle in the linear plane that is orthogonal to
−→
1 .
If we choose such a representation, the quotient space Um can inherit the
Euclidean distance from Rm; for example, we can evaluate distances along the
edges of the cube in Figure 2(a), or along the unit circle in Figure 2(b). But
it is clear that the result will depend on the representation chosen. Hence, it is
an interesting question whether one of these two representations, or yet another
one, has canonical reasons to be used. But before answering this question, we
need to explore in more generality the geometrical properties of the utility space.
Geometry on the Utility Space 5
3 Duality with the Tangent Hyperplane of Lotteries
In this section, we remark that the utility space is a dual of the space of pairs
of lotteries. Not only does it give a different point of view on the utility space
(which we think is interesting by itself), but it will also be helpful to prove
Theorem 3, which characterizes the summation operator that we will define in
Section 4.
In the example represented in Figure 3, we consider m = 3 candidates and−→u = ( 53 ;− 13 ;− 43 ). The great triangle, or simplex, is the space of lotteries L3.
Hatchings are the agent’s indifference lines: she is indifferent between any pair
of lotteries on the same line (see [12], Section 6.B). The utility vector −→u repre-
sented here is in the plane of the simplex, but it is not mandatory: indeed, −→u
can be arbitrarily chosen in its equivalence class
∼
u. Nevertheless, it is a quite
natural choice, because the component of −→u in the direction −→1 (orthogonal to
the simplex) has no meaning in terms of preferences.
L1
L2
L3
1
1
1
L3
−→u
Fig. 3. Space L3 of lotteries over 3 candidates.
The utility vector −→u can be seen as a gradient of preference: at each point, it
reveals in what directions the agent can find lotteries she likes better. However,
only the direction of −→u is important, whereas its norm has no specific meaning.
As a consequence, the utility space is not exactly a dual space, but rather a
quotient of a dual space, as we will see more formally.
For any two lotteries L = (L1, . . . , Lm) and M = (M1, . . . ,Mm), we call
bipoint from L to M the vector
−−→
LM = (M1−L1, . . . ,Mm−Lm). We call tangent
polytope of Lm the set T of bipoints of Lm.
We call tangent hyperplane of Lm:
H = {(∆1, . . . ,∆m) ∈ Rm s.t.
m∑
j=1
∆j = 0}.
In Figure 3, the tangent polytope T is the set of the bipoints of the great
triangle, seen as a part of a vector space (whereas Lm is a part of an affine
space). The tangent hyperplane H is the whole linear hyperplane containing T .
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Let us note 〈−→u | −→v 〉 the canonical inner product of −→u and −→v . We call positive
half-hyperplane associated to −→u the set −→u + = {−→∆ ∈ H s.t. 〈−→u | −→∆ 〉 ≥ 0}. By
definition, a lottery M is preferred to a lottery L iff the bipoint
−−→
LM belongs to
this positive half-hyperplane:
L ≤∼u M ⇔ 〈−→u |
−−→
LM 〉 ≥ 0⇔ −−→LM ∈ −→u +.
Let H? be the dual space of H, that is, the set of linear forms on H. For any−→u ∈ Rm, we call linear form associated to −→u the following element of H?:
〈−→u | : H → R−→
∆ → 〈−→u | −→∆ 〉.
We observed that the utility vector can be seen as a gradient, except that only its
direction matters, not its norm. Let us formalize this idea. For any (f, g) ∈ (H?)2,
we denote f ∼ g iff these two linear forms are positive multiples of each other,
that is, iff ∃a ∈ (0,+∞) s.t. g = af . We denote ∼pi(f) = {g ∈ H? s.t. f ∼ g}: it
is the equivalence class of f , up to positive multiplication.
Proposition 1 For any (−→u ,−→v ) ∈ (Rm)2, we have:
−→u ∼ −→v ⇔ 〈−→u | ∼ 〈−→v |.
The following application is a bijection:
Θ :
Um → H?/ ∼
∼
pi(−→u )→ ∼pi(〈−→u |).
Proof. −→u ∼ −→v
⇔ ∃a ∈ (0,+∞),∃b ∈ R s.t. −→v − a−→u = b−→1
⇔ ∃a ∈ (0,+∞) s.t. −→v − a−→u is orthogonal to H
⇔ ∃a ∈ (0,+∞) s.t. ∀−→∆ ∈ H, 〈−→v | −→∆ 〉 = a〈−→u | −→∆ 〉
⇔ 〈−→u | ∼ 〈−→v |.
The implication ⇒ proves that Θ is correctly defined: indeed, if ∼pi(−→u ) =
∼
pi(−→v ), then ∼pi(〈−→u |) = ∼pi(〈−→v |). The implication ⇐ ensures that Θ is injective.
Finally, Θ is obviously surjective.
Hence, the utility space can be seen as a quotient of the dual H? of the
tangent space H of the lotteries Lm. As noticed before, a utility vector may be
seen, up to a positive constant, as a uniform gradient, i.e. as a linear form over
H that reveals, for any point in the space of lotteries, in what directions the
agent can find lotteries that she likes better.
4 Inversion and Summation Operators
As a quotient of Rm, the utility space inherits natural operations from Rm:
inversion and summation. We will see that both these quotient operators have an
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intuitive meaning regarding preferences. The summation will also allow to define
lines in Section 5, which will be a key notion for Theorem 5, characterizing the
suitable Riemannian metrics.
We define the inversion operator of Um as:
− : Um → Um∼
pi(−→u )→ ∼pi(−−→u ).
This operator is correctly defined and it is a bijection; indeed,
∼
pi(−→u ) = ∼pi(−→v )
iff
∼
pi(−−→u ) = ∼pi(−−→v ). Considering this additive inverse amounts to reverting the
agent’s preferences, without modifying their relative intensities.
Now, we want to push the summation operator from Rm to the quotient Um.
We use a generic method to push an operator to a quotient space: considering
∼
u and
∼
v in Um, their antecedents are taken in Rm thanks to ∼pi−1, the sum is
computed in Rm, then the result is converted back into the quotient space Um,
thanks to
∼
pi.
However, the result is not unique. Indeed, let us take arbitrary representa-
tives −→u ∈ ∼u and −→v ∈ ∼v. In order to compute the sum, we can think of any
representatives. So, possible sums are a−→u +a′−→v + (b+ b′)−→1 , where a and a′ are
positive and where b + b′ is any real number. Converting back to the quotient,
we can get for example
∼
pi(2−→u +−→v ) and ∼pi(−→u +3−→v ), which are generally distinct.
As a consequence, the output is not a point in the utility space Um, but rather
a set of points, i.e. an element of P(Um).
This example shows how we could define the sum of two elements
∼
u and
∼
v.
In order to be more general, we will define the sum of any number of elements
of Um. Hence we also take P(Um) as the set of inputs.
We define the summation operator as:∑
:
P(Um)→ P(Um)
A → {∼pi (∑ni=1−→ui) , n ∈ N, (−→u1, . . . ,−→un) ∈ (∼pi−1(A))n} .
−→u
−→v
∑{∼u,∼v}
−→
h1
−→
h2
−→
h3
Fig. 4. Sum of two utility vectors in the utility space U4.
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Example 2 Let us consider U4, the utility space for 4 candidates. In Figure 4,
for the purpose of visualization, we represent its projection in H, which is per-
mitted by the choice of normalization constants b. Since H is a 3-dimensional
space, let (
−→
h1,
−→
h2,
−→
h3) be an orthonormal base of it.
For two non-trivial utility vectors
∼
u and
∼
v, the choice of normalization mul-
tiplicators a allow to choose representatives −→u and −→v whose Euclidean norm
is 1.
In this representation, the sum
∑{∼u, ∼v} consists of utilities corresponding to
vectors a−→u + a′−→v , where a and a′ are nonnegative. Indeed, we took a represen-
tation in H, so all normalization constants b vanish. Moreover, a, a′ or both
can be equal to zero because our definition allows to ignore −→u , −→v or both. Up to
taking representatives of unitary norm for non-trivial utility vectors, let us note
that the sum
∑{∼u, ∼v} can be represented by the dotted line and the point −→0 of
total indifference.
Geometrically, the sum is the quotient of the convex hull of the inputs. Note
that this convex hull is actually a convex cone. We will see below the interpre-
tation of the sum in terms of preferences.
Due to our definition of the sum operator, we consider the closed cone: for
example, the inputs themselves (e.g.
∼
u) fit in our definition, and so is the total
indifference
∼
pi(
−→
0 ). That would not be the case if we took only
∼
pi(a−→u +a′−→v +b−→1 ),
where a > 0 and a′ > 0. The purpose of this convention is to have a concise
wording for Theorem 3 that follows.
We now prove that, if A is the set of the utility vectors of a population, then∑
A is the set of utility vectors that respect the unanimous preferences of the
population.
Theorem 3 (characterization of the sum) Let A ∈ P(Um) and ∼v ∈ Um.
The following conditions are equivalent.
1.
∼
v ∈∑A.
2. ∀(L,M) ∈ Lm2:
[
(∀∼u ∈ A,L ≤∼u M)⇒ L ≤∼v M
]
.
Proof. First, let us remark that the tangent polytope T generates the tangent
hyperplane H by positive multiplication. That is:
∀−→∆ ∈ H,∃−−→LM ∈ T ,∃λ ∈ (0,+∞) s.t. −→∆ = λ−−→LM.
Indeed, T contains a neighborhood of the origin in vector space H.
Let −→v ∈ ∼pi−1(∼v). We have the following equivalences.
– ∀(L,M) ∈ Lm2, (∀∼u ∈ A,L ≤∼u M)⇒ L ≤∼v M ,
– ∀−−→LM ∈ T ,
(
∀−→u ∈ ∼pi−1(A), 〈−→u | −−→LM 〉 ≥ 0
)
⇒ 〈−→v | −−→LM 〉 ≥ 0,
– ∀−→∆ ∈ H,
(
∀−→u ∈ ∼pi−1(A), 〈−→u | −→∆ 〉 ≥ 0
)
⇒ 〈−→v | −→∆ 〉 ≥ 0 (because T gener-
ates H),
–
⋂
−→u∈∼pi−1(A)
−→u + ⊂ −→v +,
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– −→v is in the convex cone of ∼pi−1(A) (because of the duality seen in Section 3),
–
∼
v ∈∑A.
Example 4 Let us consider a non-indifferent
∼
u and let us examine the sum of
∼
u and its additive inverse −∼u. By a direct application of the definition, the sum
consists of
∼
u, −∼u and ∼0.
However, we have just proved that the sum is the subset of utility vectors
preserving the unanimous preferences over lotteries. Intuitively, we could think
that, since
∼
u and −∼u seem to always disagree, any utility vector ∼v respects the
empty set of their common preferences; so, their sum should be the whole space.
But this is not a correct intuition.
Indeed, let us examine the example of −→u = (1, 0, . . . , 0). About any two lot-
teries L and M , inverse opinions
∼
u and −∼u agree iff L1 = M1: in that case,
both
∼
u and −∼u are indifferent between L and M . The only points of the utility
space meeting this common property are
∼
u and −∼u themselves, as well as the
indifference point
∼
0.
5 Riemannian Representation of the Utility Space
Since the utility space is a manifold, it is a natural desire to endow it with a
Riemannian metric. In this section, we prove that there is a limited choice of
metrics that are coherent with the natural properties of the space and with the
a priori symmetry between the candidates.
First, let us note that the indifference point
∼
0 must be excluded. Indeed, its
unique open neighborhood is Um in whole, and no distance is consistent with this
property6. In contrast, Um \ {
∼
0} has the same topology as a sphere of dimension
m− 2, so it can be endowed with a distance.
Now, let us define the round metric. The quotient Rm/ vect(−→1 ) is identified
to H and endowed with the inner product inherited from the canonical one of
Rm. The utility space Um \{
∼
0} is identified to the unit sphere of H and endowed
with the induced Riemannian structure. We note ξ0 this Riemannian metric on
Um \ {
∼
0}.
In order to get an intuitive vision of this metric, one can represent any po-
sition
∼
u by a vector −→u that verifies ∑ui = 0 and ∑u2i = 1. We obtain the
(m − 2)-dimensional unit sphere of H and we consider the metric induced by
the canonical Euclidean metric of Rm. That is, distances are measured on the
surface of the sphere, using the restriction of the canonical inner product on each
tangent space. For m = 3, such a representation has already been illustrated in
Figure 2(b).
With this representation in mind, we can give a formula to compute distances
with ξ0. We denote J the m×m matrix whose all coefficients are equal to 1 and
PH the matrix of the orthogonal projection on H:
PH = Id− 1
m
J.
6 Technically, this remark proves that Um (with its natural quotient topology) is not
a T1 space [8].
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The canonical Euclidean norm of −→u is denoted ‖−→u ‖. For two non-indifferent
utility vectors −→u and −→v , the distance between ∼u and ∼v in the sense of metric ξ0
is:
d(
∼
u,
∼
v) = arccos
〈
PH−→u
‖PH−→u ‖
∣∣∣∣ PH−→v‖PH−→v ‖
〉
.
If −→u and −→v are already unit vectors of H, i.e. canonical representatives of their
equivalence classes
∼
u and
∼
v, then the formula amounts to d(
∼
u,
∼
v) = arccos〈−→u | −→v 〉.
A natural property for the distance would be that its geodesics coincide with
the unanimity segments defined by the sum. Indeed, imagine that Betty with
utilities
∼
uB is succesfully trying to convince Alice with initial utilities
∼
uA to
change her mind. Assume that Alice evolves continuously, so that her utility
follows a path from
∼
uA to
∼
uB . Unless Betty argues in a quite convoluted way, it
makes sense to assume on one hand that Alice’s path is a shortest path, and on
the other hand that whenever Alice and Betty initially agree on the comparison
of two lotteries, this agreement continues to hold all along the path. This is
precisely what assumption 1a below means: shortest paths preserve agreements
that hold at both their endpoints.
We will now prove that for m ≥ 4, the spherical representation is the only
one that is coherent with the natural properties of the space and that respects
the a priori symmetry between candidates.
Theorem 5 (Riemannian representation of the utility space) We assume
that m ≥ 4. Let ξ be a Riemannian metric on Um \ {
∼
0}.
Conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent.
1. (a) For any non-antipodal pair of points
∼
u,
∼
v ∈ Um \ {
∼
0} (i.e. ∼v 6= −∼u), the
set
∑{∼u, ∼v} of elements respecting the unanimous preferences of ∼u and
∼
v is a segment of a geodesic of ξ; and
(b) for any permutation σ of {1, . . . ,m}, the action Φσ induced on Um \ {
∼
0}
by
(u1, . . . , um)→ (uσ(1), . . . , uσ(m))
is an isometry.
2. ∃λ ∈ (0,+∞) s.t. ξ = λξ0.
Proof. Since the implication 2 ⇒ 1 is obvious, we now prove 1 ⇒ 2. The deep
result behind this is a classical theorem of Beltrami, which dates back to the
middle of the nineteenth century: see [3] and [4].
The image of a 2-dimensional subspace of H in Um \ {
∼
0} by the canonical
projection
∼
pi is called a line in Um \ {
∼
0}. This notion is deeply connected to the
summation operator: indeed, the sum of two non antipodal points in Um\{
∼
0} is a
segment of the line joining them. Condition 1a precisely means that the geodesics
of ξ are the lines of Um \ {
∼
0}. Beltrami’s theorem then states that Um \ {
∼
0} has
constant curvature. Note that this result is in fact more subtle in dimension 2
(that is, for m = 4) than in higher dimensions; see [13], Theorem 1.18 and [14],
Theorem 7.2 for proofs.
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Since Um \ {
∼
0} is a topological sphere, this constant curvature must be pos-
itive. Up to multiplying ξ by a constant, we can assume that this constant
curvature is 1. As a consequence, there is an isometry Ψ : Sm−2 → Um \ {
∼
0},
where Sm−2 is the unit sphere of Rm−1, endowed with its usual round metric.
The function Ψ obviously maps geodesic to geodesics, let us deduce the following.
Lemma 6 There is a linear map Λ : Rm−1 → H inducing Ψ , that is such that:
Ψ ◦Π = Π ◦ Λ,
where Π denotes both projections Rm−1 → Sm−2 and H → Um \ {
∼
0}.
Proof. First, Ψ maps any pair of antipodal points of Sm−2 to a pair of antipodal
points of Um \ {
∼
0}: indeed in both cases antipodal pairs are characterized by the
fact that there are more than one geodesic containing them. It follows that Ψ
induces a map Ψ ′ from the projective space P(Rm−1) (which is the set of lines
through the origin in Rm−1, identified with the set of pairs of antipodal points of
Sm−2) to the projective space P(H) (which is the set of lines through the origin
in H, identified with the set of pairs of antipodal points of Um \ {
∼
0}).
The fact that Ψ sends geodesics of Sm−2 to geodesics of Um\{
∼
0} and condition
1a together imply that Ψ ′ sends projective lines to projective lines.
As is well known, a one-to-one map Rn → Rn which sends lines to lines must
be an affine map; a similar result holds in projective geometry, concluding that
Ψ ′ must be a projective map. See e.g. [1] for both results.
That Ψ ′ is projective exactly means that there is a linear map Λ : Rm−1 → H
inducing Ψ ′, which then induces Ψ : Sm−2 → Um \ {
∼
0}.
Using Λ to push the canonical inner product of Rm−1, we get that there
exists an inner product (−→u ,−→v ) → φ(−→u ,−→v ) on H that induces ξ, in the sense
that ξ is the Riemannian metric obtained by identifying Um \ {
∼
0} with the unit
sphere defined in H by φ and restricting φ to it.
The last thing to prove is that φ is the inner product coming from the canon-
ical one on Rm. Note that hypothesis 1b is mandatory, since any inner product
on H does induce on Um \ {
∼
0} a Riemannian metric satisfying 1a.
Each canonical basis vector −→ej = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) defines a point in Um \ {
∼
0}
and a half-line `j = R+ej in H. Condition 1b ensures that these half-lines are
permuted by some isometries of (H, φ). In particular, there are vectors −→uj ∈ `j
that have constant pairwise distance (for φ).
Lemma 7 The family −→u1, . . . ,−−−→um−1 is, up to multiplication by a scalar, the
unique basis of H such that −→uj ∈ `j and
∑
j<m
−→uj ∈ −`m.
Proof. First, by definition of the −→uj , these vectors form a regular simplex and∑
j
−→uj = −→0 . It follows that −→u1, . . . ,−−−→um−1 has the required property and we have
left to show uniqueness.
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Assume −→v1 , . . . ,−−−→vm−1 is a basis of H such that −→vj ∈ `j and
∑
j<m
−→vj ∈ −`m.
Then there are positive scalars a1, . . . , am such that
−→vj = aj−→uj for all j < m,
and
∑
j<m
−→vj = am
∑
j<m
−→uj .
Then
∑
j<m aj
−→uj =
∑
j<m am
−→uj , and since the uj form a basis, it must hold
aj = am for all j.
Now consider the canonical inner product φ0 on H that comes from the
canonical one on Rm. Since permutations of coordinates are isometries, we get
that the vectors −→vj = Π(−→ej ) (where Π is now the orthogonal projection from Rm
to H) form a regular simplex for φ0, so that
∑
j
−→vj = −→0 . It follows that −→uj = λ−→vj
for some λ > 0 and all j. We deduce that the −→uj form a regular simplex for both
φ and φ0, which must therefore be multiple from each other. This finishes the
proof of Theorem 5.
However, the implication 1 ⇒ 2 in the theorem is not true for m = 3. For
each non-indifferent utility vector, let us consider its representative verifying
min(ui) = 0 and max(ui) = 1. This way, Um \ {
∼
0} is identified to edges of the
unit cube in R3, as in Figure 2(a). We use this identification to endow Um \ {
∼
0}
with the metric induced on these edges by the canonical inner product on R3.
Then conditions 1a and 1b of the theorem are met, but not condition 2.
Another remark is of paramount importance about this theorem. Since we
have a canonical representative −→u for each equivalence class ∼u as a unit vector
of H, we could be tempted to use it to compare utilities between several agents.
We stress on the fact that this representation cannot be used for interpersonal
comparison of utility levels or utility differences.
For example, for two agents, consider the following representatives:{−→u = (0.00, 0.71,−0.71) ,−→v = (0.57, 0.22,−0.79) .
The fact that v3 < u3 does not mean that an agent with preferences
∼
v dislikes
candidate 3 more than an agent with preferences
∼
u. Similarly, when changing
from candidate 1 to candidate 2, the gain for agent
∼
u (+0.71) cannot be compared
to the loss for agent
∼
v (−0.35).
Theorem 5 conveys no message for interpersonal comparison of utilities. In-
deed, utilities belonging to two agents are essentially incomparable in the absence
of additional assumptions [9]. Taking canonical representatives on the (m− 2)-
dimensional sphere is only used to compute distances between two points in the
utility space.
6 Application: Probability Measures on the Utility Space
Once the space is endowed with a metric, it is endowed with a natural probability
measure: the uniform measure in the sense of this metric (this is possible because
the space has a finite total measure). We will denote µ0 this measure, which is
thus the normalized Riemannian volume defined by the metric ξ0.
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In practice, to draw vectors according to a uniform probability law over
Um \ {
∼
0}, it is sufficient to use a uniform law on the unit sphere in H. In other
words, once one identifies Um \ {
∼
0} with the unit sphere in H, then µ0 is exactly
the usual uniform measure.
In the present case, the fact that the round sphere has many symmetries
implies additional nice qualities for µ0, which we sum up in a proposition.
Proposition 8 Let µ be any probability measure on Um \ {
∼
0}.
1. Assume that for all δ > 0, µ gives the same probability to all the balls in
Um \ {
∼
0} of radius δ (in the metric ξ0); then µ = µ0.
2. If µ is invariant under all isometries for the metric ξ0, then µ = µ0.
Both characterizations are classical; the first one is (a strengthening of) the
definition of the Riemannian volume, and the second one follows from the first
and the fact that any two points on the round sphere can be mapped one to the
other by an isometry.
Vertex 1 > 2, 3, 4
Vertex 1, 4 > 2, 3
Facet 1 > 4 > 3 > 2
Edge 1 > 4 > 2, 3
(a) Uniform (Impartial Culture). (b) Von Mises–Fisher.
Fig. 5. Two distributions of 100 agents on U4.
In Figure 5(a), we represent a distribution with 100 agents drawn uniformly
and independently on the sphere, with 4 candidates. Like for Figure 4, we rep-
resented only the unit sphere of H.
The solid dark lines draw the permutohedron, a geometrical figure represent-
ing the ordinal aspect of these preferences. Each facet is constituted of all the
points who share the same strict order of preference. A utility vector belongs to
an edge if it has only three distinct utilities: for example, if the agent prefers
candidate 1 to 4, 4 to 2 and 3, but is indifferent between candidates 2 and 3.
Finally, a point is a vertex if it has only two distinct utilities: for example, if the
agent prefers candidate 1 to all the others, but is indifferent between the others.
In this distribution, each agent has almost surely a strict order of preference.
Each order has the same probability and agents are independent, hence this
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distribution is a natural generalization of the Impartial Culture when considering
expected utilities.
Since the point
∼
0 is a geometrical singularity, it is difficult to include it
naturally in such a measure. If one wants to take it into account, the easiest way
is to draw it with a given probability and to use the distribution on Um \ {
∼
0} in
the other cases. That being said, we have just noticed that all other non-strict
orders have a measure equal to 0 ; so for a canonical theoretical model, it can
be argued that a natural choice is to attribute a measure 0 to the indifference
point also.
Having a distance, hence a uniform measure, allows also to define other mea-
sures by their densities with respect to the uniform measure. Here is an example
of a law defined by its density. Given a vector −→u0 in the unit sphere of H and
κ a nonnegative real number, the Von Mises–Fisher (VMF) distribution of pole−→u0 and concentration κ is defined by the following density with respect to the
uniform law on the unit sphere in H:
p(−→u ) = Cκeκ〈−→u | −→u0 〉,
where Cκ is a normalization constant. Given the mean resultant vector of a dis-
tribution over the sphere, VMF distribution maximizes the entropy, in the same
way that, in the Euclidean space, Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy
among laws with given mean and standard deviation. Hence, without additional
information, it is the “natural” distribution that should be used. Figure 5(b)
represents such a distribution, with the same conventions as Figure 5(a). To
draw a VMF distribution, we used Ulrich’s algorithm revised by Wood [15,18].
Qualitatively, VMF model is similar to Mallows model, which is used for
ordinal preferences [11]. In the later, the probability of an order of preference σ
is:
p(σ) = Dκe
−κδ(σ,σ0),
where σ0 is the mode of the distribution, δ(σ, σ0) a distance between σ and σ0
(typically Kendall’s tau distance), κ a nonnegative real number (concentration)
and Dk a normalization constant. Both VMF and Mallows models describe a
culture where the population is polarized, i.e. scattered around a central point,
with more or less concentration.
However, there are several differences.
– VMF distribution allows to draw a specific point on the utility sphere,
whereas Mallows’ chooses only a facet of the permutohedron.
– In particular, the pole of a VMF distribution can be anywhere in this con-
tinuum. For example, even if its pole is in the facet 1 > 4 > 3 > 2, it can be
closer to the facet 1 > 4 > 2 > 3 than to the facet 4 > 1 > 3 > 2. Such a
nuance is not possible in Mallows model.
– In the neighborhood of the pole, VMF probability decreases like the expo-
nential of the square of the distance (because the inner product is the cosine
of the distance), whereas Mallows probability decreases like the exponential
of the distance (not squared).
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– VMF is the maximum entropy distribution, given a spherical mean and dis-
persion (similarly to a Gaussian distribution in a Euclidean space), whereas
Mallows’ model is not characterized by such a property of maximum entropy.
The existence of a canonical measure allows to define other probability mea-
sures easily in addition to the two we have just described. Such measures can
generate artificial populations of agents for simulation purposes. They can also
be used to fit the data from real-life experiments to a theoretical model, and as
a neutral comparison point for such data.
To elaborate on this last point, let us stress that given a (reasonably regular)
distribution µ on a space such as Um\{
∼
0} there is a priori no way to define what
it means for an element
∼
u to be more probable than another one
∼
v. Indeed, both
have probability 0 and what would make sense is to compare the probability of
being close to
∼
u to the probability of being close to
∼
v. But one should compare
neighborhoods of the same size, and one needs a metric to make this comparison.
Alternatively, if one has a reference distribution such as µ0, then it makes sense
to consider the density f = dµdµ0 , which is a (continuous, say) function on Um\{
∼
0}.
Then we can compare f(
∼
u) and f(
∼
v) to say whether one of these elements is more
probable than the other according to µ. Note that in the present case, comparing
the probability of δ-neighborhoods for the metric ξ0 or the density relative to
µ0 gives the same result in the limit δ → 0, which is the very definition of the
Riemannian volume.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the geometrical properties of the classical model of expected
utilities, introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, when candidates are
considered symmetrical a priori. We have remarked that the utility space may
be seen as a dual of the space of lotteries, that inversion and summation operators
inherited from Rm have a natural interpretation in terms of preferences and that
the space has a spherical topology when the indifference point is removed.
We have proved that the only Riemannian representation whose geodesics
coincide with the projective lines naturally defined by the summation operator
and which respects the symmetry between candidates is a round sphere.
All these considerations lay on the principle to add as little information as
possible in the system, especially by respecting the a priori symmetry between
candidates. This does not imply that the spherical representation of the utility
space Um is the most relevant one in order to study a specific situation. Indeed,
as soon as one has additional information (for example, a model that places
candidates in a political spectrum), it is natural to include it in the model.
However, if one wishes, for example, to study a voting system in all generality,
without focusing on its application in a specific field, it looks natural to consider
a utility space with a metric as neutral as possible, like the one defined in this
paper by the spherical representation.
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